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Constituency Influence on Senate Voting:
Public School Desegregation
STEVEN

A.

SHULL

University of New Orleans
I. INTRODUCTION
This research attempts to ascertain the correspondence between U.S.
senator's voting behavior and constituency preferences across region and
party on the narrow issue of desegregation of public schools. It is recognized
that constituency influenc e for senators is likely to be harder to ascertain than
for members of the House since it appears that senators are "less subject to
constituency and partisan pressures. " 1 Nevertheless, the Senate was selected
partly because of the larger number and more varied roll-calls for the time
frame under consideration (1969-70).
Roll-calls have the advantage of being "hard ", quantifiable data , and
constitute an important component oflegislative behavior .2 umerous other
factors, some of them exogenous, must be considered as well . Although the
primary units of analysis in this res ea rch for both constituents and senators are
reg ion and party , numerous demographic and attribute characteristics will
also be considered as determinants of attitudes (for constituents) and voting
behavior (for legislators ). The roll-calls dealt with specific policy issues , while
the SRC attitudinal questions were more amorphous cognitions. As with the
Miller and Stokes study, 3 this research cannot tell how much control constituent attitudes have over th e roll-call behavior of senators, but it can
suggest that it is an important influence not to be ignored .
Repres entation
The ancient concept of representation
has received considerable
philosophical discussion. 4 Legislators vary substantially in th eir style of rep'Aage R. Clausen and R. B. Cheney , "Comparative Analysis of Senate-House Voting on
Economic and Welfare Policy: 1953-64," American Political Science Review, 64 (March, 1970),
pp. 150-151.
2
Usefu1 evaluation s of roll-call analysis include : David B. Truman , The Congressional Party:
A Case Study (New York: Wiley , 1959), p. ~2; Lee Anderson , et al., Legislative Roll-Call Analysis
(Evanston , Il1mo1s: Northwestern U111vers1tyPress , 1966); Dun can MacRae , Issues and Parties in
Legislative Voting (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Wilder Crane , "A Caveat on Roll-Call
Studies of Party Voting ," Midwest]oumal of Political Science, IV (August, 1960), pp. 237-249 ;
Fred I. Greenstein and Alton F. Jackson, "A Second Look at the Validity of Roll-Call Analysis,"
Midwest j ournal of Political Science, VII (1963), pp. 156-166.
3
Warren E. Miller and Don aldhE . Stokes , "Constituency Influence in Congress ," A,nerican
Political Science Review, 57 (1963), pp. 45-56.
4
Most of th e earlier definitions of representation are not useful for ana lytical research. An
e_xte~.s
ive su~mary ~f.th ese i:naybe found in John A. Fairlie , "The ature of Political Rep rese nt ation, Amencan Political Science Review, 34 (April -Jun e, 1940), p. 236-248, 456-466. Gilbert
presents the philosophical basis for the following six intellectua traditions of representation :
idealist , utilitarian, formalist , pragmatic, participatory , and populist (Charles E. Gilbert , "Operative Doctrines of Repr ese ntation ," American Political Science Review, 57 (1963). Other recent
concept ual works include: H . Pitkin , Concept of Representatio n (Ber keley: University of Califorma Press, 1967); J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds .), Representat ion (Chicago: Atherton, 1968);
and Neal Riemer, The Representati ve: Truste e? Delegate? Partisan? Politics? (Boston : Heath
1967).
'
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resentation and whether or not representatives are responsive to their constituents' wishes has been widely debated in the literature. 5 Constituents
seldom speak with a clear voice, and there is no district viewpoint on most
issues. 6 Although this phenomenon leaves legislators substantial latitude in
decision-making, there does appear to be a high degree of correspondence
between senators and constituents on the general issue of civil rights for
blacks. Empirical evidence has shown that race is perhaps the one issue on
which congressmen are most in touch with their constituency. 7 Accordingly,
one can expect to find a correlation between constituency and a senator's
voting behavior on the more specific issue of school desegregation.
Neither the legislator nor the constituent has a very good indication of each
other's policy preferences. 8 The relationship that does exist between them
appears generally to run in one direction since constituents have little knowledge of congressional attitudes or behavior on most issues. 9 Congressional
affairs generally have a low visibility to the mass electorate, which exhibits
little knowledge of the substantive issues under consideration. 10
Cnudde and McCrone extended Miller and Stokes' analysis by focusing on
the intervening path between the representative's attitude - a linkage that
was unresolved by Miller and Stokes. Although Cnudde and McCrone were
concerned only with the civil rights issue, they determined that Miller and
Stokes had "underestimated the relative importance of the indirect impact of
perception through congressional attitudes. " 11 Although constituents do not
select representatives om the basis of the legislator's attitudes, "representatives are motivated to bring their own attitudes into line with their perception
of constituency attitude. " 12
There is evidence 13 that those congressmen from competitive districts are
more likely to be constituency-oriented, leading to the hypothesis that such
5
Those advocating constituency influence include : Duncan MacRae , Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley: Unjyersity of California Press , 1958), p. 278; George B. Galloway,
Legislative Process in Congress (New York: Crowell , 1955), pp . 198-215; Duncan MacRae,
"Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House ofReP.resentatives", American Political Science Review, 46 (1952), pp. 1046-1055; Wilder Crane , Do Representative Represent? ", Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), pp. 295-299. Other commentators
believe constituency to be ofless salience to legislative behavior than commonly assumed; Donald
E. Stokes and Warren Miller , '"Party Government and the Salience of Congress," Public Opinion
Quarterly, 26 (1962), pp . 531-546 ; Miller and Stokes; and Roger Davidson, Role of the Congressma n (Indianapolis : Pegasus , 1969).
6 Davidson , p. 120; Lewis A. Dexter , "Representative and His District, " Human Organization, 16 (1947),/P· 2-13.
7
Miller an Stokes, pp. 45-56.
6Ibid.
9 lbid.; Warren E. Miller , " Majority Rule and the Representative System of Government ,"
in Allardt and Littunen (eds. ), Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems : Contributions to
Comparative Political Sociology, Westermarck Society, 1964, p. 345.
10 Stokes and Miller .
uc. F. Cnudde and D. J. McCrone , " Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Con gressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model ," American Political Science Review 60 (March,
1966), p . 72.
12lbid., p. 70.
13 Davidson , p. 141; Heinz Eulau , et al., " Role of the Representative ," American Political
Science Review, 53 (1959), pp. 742-756.
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congressmen will more closely approximate constituency attitudes on desegregated schools than congressmen from safe states. Miller's findings would
suggest the opposite was true , however . 14 Wolfinger and Hollinger found
little difference between legislators from competitive and non-competitiv e
districts . 15 There is also some evidence for the proposition that senators from
more heterogenous states enjoy greater isolation from constituency pressures
than do those from more homogenous states. 16
Partisanship
Constituents and representatives are known to each other primarily by
their party association. 17 Although party identification is the single most
important variable explaining congressional voting behavior, constituency is
the most salient factor explaining divergence from party position. 18 Thus ,
constituency characteristics seem to be related to partisanship in legislative
behavior . The contrast between policy positions of Democrats and Republicans in Congress is greater among legislators from safe districts and less among
congressmen from marginal districts . Close electoral competition seems to
limit the difference between policy alternatives offered the voters. 19
Political parties take clearer ideological stands on some issues than on
others. Yet party and constituency influences are often used to interpret the
"facts" as members choose , reinforcing already held positions .20 Party unity is
more easily maintained on unimportant issues and those of little concern to
legislators. 21 It appears that senators are less willing to submit to party
leadership than members of the House . 22 Although the limitations of party
influence have been widely discussed in the literature, 23 McRae found that
Democrats are consistently more divided across a wide range of issues than are
14

Miller , pp. 369, 373.
Raymond Wolfinger and Joan Holling e r, "Safe Seats , Se niority , and Power in Congr ess,"
American Political Science Review , 59 Oune, 1965), pp . 337-349.
16
Donald R. Matth ews, U.S . Senator s and Their World ( ew York: Vintage, 1960), p . 237.
17
Miller and Stokes.
1
8Truman ; MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Votin g; Lewis A. From an and Randall 8 .
Ripley, "Conditions for Part y Leade rship : Th e Ca e of th e Hou se Democrat s," Am erican Political
Science Review, 59 (March , 1965), pp . 52, 61; Julius Turner , Party and Constitu ency: Pressures
on Congr ess (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Univer sity Press, 1951); Charl es Clapp , The Con~ressman : His Work As He Sees It (New York: Anchor , 1963), pp . 162-168; and Lewis A. Froman ,
Interparty Constituency Differences and Congr essional Voting Behavior ," Am erican Political
Science Review, 57 (March , 1963), pp . 57.
19 Miller , p . 356.
20
Lewi s A. Dexter, Sociology and Politics of Congr ess (Chicago : Rand Mc ally, 1969), pp .
152-160; Theodore Lowi, "American Business , Public Policy, Case Studie s, and Political
Theory ," World Politics, XVI Ouly, 1964), p . 684; Ralph Huitt , "Congre ssional Committ ee : A
Case Study ," Am erican Political Science Review, 48 Uune, 1954), pp . 340-365, and Anthony
Downs , Inside Bur eaucracy (Boston : Little , Brown , 1967), Ch. 15.
21
Cran e, "Cav eat on Roll Call Studies of Party Voting ," p . 247.
_ 22 Randal B. Ripley , Majority Party Lead ership in Congress (Boston : Little , Brown , 1969), p.
184
23
Truman , p . 95; Ralph K. Huitt , "De mocratic Party Lead ership in the Senate ," Am erican
Political Science Review, 55 Oune , 1961), pp . 331-344 .
15
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Republicans. 24 Clausen's research confirmed MacRae ' s fmding , at least on th e
issue of civil rights. 25 Democrats also differ from Republicans in that they
represent more liberal districts , 26 and are less likely to be constituencyoriented .27 Also, Southerners from both parties tend to have lower party
loyalty scores than non-Southern legislators. 28

Region and Personal Dimensions of Voting Behavior
It is likely that there are influences other than party and constituency that
affect a senator 's voting behavior on desegregation of schools. Research has
detected numerous variables that seem to be related to legislative decisionmaking. 29 This paper contends that election margin , age, seniority , and
region should be considered in addition to constituency attitudes as determinants of legislative behavior. Region is of particular concern in this research
effort .
The "socialization process within a given state is unique", 30 and senators
from the same state are likely to have similar voting records .31 An important
thesis of this paper, however , is that personal and state characteristics can
meaningfully be aggregated to the region level. Wolfinger and Hollinger
found that divisiveness within the Democratic Party is largely a result of
urban/rural split and regional differences. 32 Clausen detected that combining
state and region into a contrived variable was important in explaining variance
on all five policy dimensions he considered (civil rights , foreign policy ,
economic , agriculture, and welfare). 33 Particularly germane to the present
study is that Clausen's region/state variable accounted for substantially more
of the unexplained variance on the civil rights dimension than any of the other
issue-areas for both the 85th and 86th Congresses .
II. METHODOLOGY
All Senate roll-calls dealing with education were collected for both sessions
of the 91st Congress from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac . The votes
24
Duncan Mac Rae, "A Method for Identifying Issu es and Factions from Legislative Votes,"
American Political Science Reoiew, 59 (1965), pp. 909-926.
••Aage R. Clausen , How Congressmen Decide (New York: St. Martins , 1973).
26
Froman , "Interparty Constituency Differ ence s and Congre ssional Voting Behavior ," p .
57.
27
Davidson , p . 130.
28 1bid ., p . 158.
29
See for example, Lee F. Anderson , "Individuality in Voting in Congress : A Rese arch
Note ," Midwest Journal of Political Science, VIII (November , 1964), pp . 425-429; Thom as Flinn
and Harold Wolman, "Constituency and Roll-Call Votin~: Case of the Southern De mocratic
Congressman ," Midw est Journal oj Political Science, X (1966), pp . 192-199; Lewis Froman ,
"Impact of Individualism in Voting in Congress ," Journal of Politics, XXV (May 1963), pp .
324-332.
30
Aage R. Clausen, "Home State Influe nce on Congressional Voting ," American Political
Science Association Convention Paper (September 1970), p . 16.
31 Matthews , p . 231.
32
Wolfmger and Hollinger .
33
Clausen , How Congr essmen Decide.
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covered many issue areas that were only tangentially related . Because of the
divergence of these issues and because of uncertainty that they measure a
common dimension of support for education, it was deemed necessary to
perform scaling operations to ascertain which dimension(s) were operative in
senators' voting decisions. Scale analysis 34 was selected in lieu of such
techniques as factor analysis, which may take the data out of a form usable in
further research.
Roll-calls were required to exhibit at least a 10% disagreement level (e.g.
90-10) to be included in the analysis. These votes were more likely to be
substantive amendments while the near unanimous roll-calls tended to be
those votes on the final passage of a bill. This cutting point is admittedly
arbitrary and is not dependent upon the number of senators actually present
and voting. Anderson et al. discuss alternative measures of contestability of
roll-calls. 35 The roll-calls were cross-tabulated with one another using the
Correl package of Osiris to determine which votes correlated highly. A Yule's
Q value of ±. 70 was the cutting point to determine whether votes would be
considered as possibly scalar. 36 After scale values were attributed to each pair
of roll-calls , they were clustered by a technique suggested by Aage Clausen. 37
The clusters that result do not indicate why legislators voted similarly, but
merely present groups of issues in which substantial voting agreement occurred. The clusters were required to be mutually exclusive in order to avoid an
artificial relationship between them. The technique is basically similar to one
utilized by Duncan MacRae. 38
Only the primary cluster was utilized in the analysis, and of the twenty
roll-calls in that cluster, twelve dealt with some aspect of the issue of desegregation in the public schools. These twelve votes were used in constructing a
34
Helpful sources on scaling include MacRae , Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting;
Anderson et al., Legislative Roll Call Analysis; Charles D . Farris, "A Method of Determining
Ideological Groupings in Congress, "journal of Politics, XX (May 1958), pp . 308-338; and George
Belknap, "A Method for Analyzing Legislative Behavior ," Midwest journal of Political Science, II
( ovember, 1958), pp. 377-402.
35
Legislative Roll Call Analysis, pp . 79 ff; see also Farris , p. 310.
36
MacRae chose ± .80 as the threshold value , as it is "high enough to separate distinct issues
but low enough to include a sufficient number ofroll-calls in the scale clusters to permit inferences
about them" ("Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes"). The lesser
criterion of ±. 70 was deemed adequate for this research as it allowed retention of some data that
would otherwise have been lost . Also, the ±. 70 cutting point eems to be a reasonable compromise between th e .5 to .9 range that others have used , and it is not without precedent itself
(see for example, Clausen and Cheney, pp. 139-140).
37
0ne begins by selecting the two roll-calls that correlate most highly with each other. Then
the vote is selected that is correlated the highest with both of those two votes. The next step is a
simple chaining operation adding the roll-call that has the highest correlation with each one
preceding until all subsequent votes have been included. One may then reproduce the complete
correlation matrix by merely submitting the program with the variables (roll-calls in this case) as
reordered . For additional sources on clustering, see: Anderson , et al., Legislative Roll Call
Analysis, Ch. 4; MacRae , "Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes";
MacRae , Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting ; John G. Crumm , "Systematic Analysis of Blocs
in the Study of Legislative Behavior, " Western Political Quarterly, XVIII Gune, 1965), pp.
350-362 .
38
Dim ensions of Congressional Voting .
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libera lism-conservatism (civil rights ) index on the issue of school desegregation . The difficulty with constructing such an index (or any index ) is the
uncertainty that th e items included are unidimensional. 39 The scaling and
subsequent clustering operations were empirical tests to help identify , as
much as possible , whether such unidimensionality exists.
A score of 1-7 was given to each senator for each of the twelve roll-calls.
This scoring technique is adapted partly from Truman 's earlier work , 40 and is
based on th e assumption that it is more accurate to rely on all available
information than on a simple yea/nay dichotomy such as is used in Guttman
scaling . After it was ascertained whether a yea was a positive (i.e . liberal ) vote,
th e coding scheme utilized was as follows:
libera l

1
voted
yea

conservative
2

3

4

5

6

paired
yea

announced
or CQ poll
yea

?

announced
nay

paired
nay

7
voted
nay

Although others have omitted categories 2-6, it is contended here that these
intervals also constitute a measure of attitude on an issue. The extreme scores ,
of course, reflect greater intensity of ideological position for the particular
roll-call under consideration . Mean scores were computed for each senator
across geographic region and political party .
Roll-calls do not always provide a clear ideological orientation on an issue ,
even when statistically manipulated through scaling, clustering , or factor
analysis for common dimensions of voting behavior. Although the present data
indicates that most senators vote in a fairly consistent (and hence predictable )
manner, some are impossible to evaluate. Sen . Margaret Chase Smith (R,
Maine), for example , had exactly six perfect liberal responses (1) and six
perfec t conserva tive responses (7). One would normally expect a conservative
senator to deviate slightly in the indicator from 4-7 but rarely to cross over into
the 1-3 range. Although perfect scales do not occur in the reality of social
science resea rch , Farris argues that legislators tend to maintain enough
consistency on th e same major issue to have scalable votes. 41 The data herein
generally confirms that judgment with a few minor exceptions.
This research assumes that legislators can be ranked on "representativeness" as determin ed by the relationship between their roll-call behavior and
constituency attitudes (also meas ured on a liberaVconservative index). It is
39Anderson , et al. , Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, p . 27.
0'frum an , p. 327.
41 Farris , pp. 308-314.
4
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assumed that the index for both constituents and senators may be an indication
of intensity of opinion on the issue of desegregation in the public schools. It is
possible that the issue of desegregated schools is not as unidimensional as it
appears, since different indicators were used for constituents and senators.
The constituency continuum ofliberalism-conservatism is based on responses
to attitudinal items from the 1968 SRC election study.
Constituency attitudes on the dimension of school desegregation were
indexed in essentially the same manner as were the roll-calls for senators,
although a lower Yule's Q value was accepted (±. 50). Eleven items fit the
scalar pattern , but since they did not have the same response pattern , they all
had to be recorded (via ICON ) into a trichotomy (liberal-moderateconservative). As with the roll-calls , the issues had to be coded (revers ed in
some cases) so that all response codings ran in the same direction.
A one-way analysis of variance subroutine of Osiris (called F Means 1)
provided a mean summary score for each constituent across the eleven items ,
forming an index of liberalism/conservatism toward school desegregation.
Filter variables (controls ) aggregated this data by region and party , giving a
mean score on the same eight data points (four regions , two parti es) as
appeared for senators. Product-moment correlations were then calculated in
order to ascertain what relationship exists between constituent attitudes and
roll-call voting on the desegregation dimension across region and party.
Additionally , partial correlations allowed consideration of the effects of constituent attitudes independent of demographic and personal attribute variables.
The analysis in this research is, of course, limited to the time frame of the
91st Congress (1969-70) and the 1968 SRC election study for roll-call behavior
and constituency attitudes respectively. No attempt is made to suggest that
the findings are applicable over a longer period of time . 42 This study avoids
the problem of encountered by Miller and Stokes of sample reliability , in
which congressional districts as the units of analysis have unequal sampling
probability. 43 Each of the four geographic regions herein constitute a representative sample in itself , and weighting problems are thus reduced. It was
still necessary to weight each of the four regions according to their proportionate members of respondents and senators. At least for th e constituency
attributes, the data can not be broken down into any smaller units (such as
states) within the four regions without violating the sampling assumptions. 44
42 For a discu ssion of the difficulti es involved in longitudinal analysis oflegislative voting , se!l
Aage R. Clausen, "Measureme nt Identity in th e Longitudinal Analysis of Legislative Voting , '
American Political Science Review, 61, no. 4 {December, 1967), pp. 1020-1035.
43 Mille r and Stokes, p. 32.
44 lt was di scovere d midway through th e analysis that a black suppl eme nt is automatically
included in all data unless it is purposely filtere d out. Thus, the often used 1673 cases of the 1968
Survey Research Center Election Study is not a random samp le as it includes an extra 116 blacks
in addition to their representative numbers in the samp le itself {l557 cases). This group of blacks
was excluded because the black supplement itself is not a rep resentative samp le, making even an
analysis of black attitudes of dubious value .
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III . FI DINGS
The first consideration in examining the results of this research effort is to
recognize that all variables were aggregated in terms of region and/or party .
This has the disadvantage of eliminating more extreme scores that may be
interesting and useful in studying representation. It is not entirely accurate in
this study to compare distances on the scale scores for constituents with those
of legislators since the constituency index has only three intervals while the
index for senators consists of seven. It is still possible to recognize , however ,
that there is less variation in constituent scores than those oflegislators. This
finding is not unexpected, as we would anticipate constituents to group toward
central or moderate positions , even on such a sensitive issue as school desegregation. At a later stage in the analysis a simple linear transformation was
performed on the constituent scores to make them equivalent to the sevenpoint scale of senators' scores.
In looking at constituent results (Table I) we see that Republican respondents were consistently more conservative on the issue of school desegregation than their Democratic counterparts across each region . The greatest
regional-party difference illustrated that North-eastern and Southern Democrats had more liberal attitudes than Republicans from those two regions . In
terms of constituency characteristics (Table II ), it is not unexpected to find
that the South had the lowest level of education while the Far West had the
highest. It may be that education is related to one 's tolerance for integrated
schools since the South as a region had the most conservative attitude, while
respondents from the Far West were the most liberal. This finding , however ,
may be more a function of the percentag e of black population of the two
regions. Again , the Far West and South were the extremes with 2.18% and
21.6 % respectively. Cynics might argue that it is easy to support integration
when one is not faced with the prospect personally. Another demographic
factor that may affect constituent attitudes is the urban /rural split. The findings herein illustrate that the two regions with the highest percentage of urban
dw ellers (Northeast and Far W est) had the most liberal attitudes while the two
regions with the least urban population had the most conservative scores
(Midwest and South ).

JOUR
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TABLE I. Mean Constituency Scores (Var . X) on School De egregation (By Region and Party)
WEIGHTED
RECIO
PARTY
TOTALS
Rep ublican s
Democrats
2.080
1.96
ortheast
1.865
(318)
(180)
(138)
2.02
2.081
Midwest
1.993
(410)
(240)
(170)
2.10
2.048
2.251
South
(416)
(306)
(110)
1.94
2.020
Far West
1.90
(224)
(
92)
(132)
Weighted
Total s

1.972

2.106
(510)
(858t
a umbers in parenthese s represent
s
(Ind ex based on 11 SRC issues)
Liberal

1.99
(1368)

Con ervative

2

1

TABLE II. Con tituent Demographic Characteristics
RECIO
% BLACK
% URBA
ortheast
5.0
70.8
(10)
Midwe st
4.4
60. 1
(12)
South
21.6
56.0
(15)
Far We st
2.2
67.6

3

AGE
31.2

EDUCATIO
10.79

29.3

10.67

27.2

9.37

27.4

11.85

28.6

10.56

(11)

=( 48)
a

9.4a

62.8

weighted mean s

This study confirm Clausen's finding that Democratic legislators are less
ideologically cohe ive than Republicans , 45 at least on the issue of school
desegregation. Democratic senators had by far the most extreme score on the
issue (range for Democrats = 4.35, for Republicans = 2.62), while Republicans tended to cluster more toward the center of the continuum (Table III).
The opposite was true for constituents, the range for Democrats being .183
and for Republicans .231. Democratic senators (with the exception of Southerners) had considerably more liberal voting records than did Republican
senators.
45

Clausen , How Congressmen Decide .
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TABLE ID. Mean Scores for Senators (Var. Y) on School Desegregation {By Region and Party )
WE IGHTED
REGION
PARTY
TOTALS
Democrats
Republicans
1. 74
2.17
Northeast
1.98
( 9)
(11)
(20)
1.38
3.94
Midwest
2.55
(13)
(11)
(24)
5.73
4.46
South
5.39
(22)
( 8)
(30)
2.88
Far West
4.79
3.66
(13)
( 9)
(22)
Weighted
Totals
3.46
3.74
3.57
(57)
(39)
(96)
(Ind ex based on 12 school desegregation roll-calls)
Liberal
Conservative
(36)
1

(12)

( 5)

( 7)

2

3

(12)
5

4

(24)
7

6

TABLE IV. Senators' Personal Characteristics
REGION

Northeast
Midwest
South
Far West
Totals

AGEa

% ELECTION MARGIN

Dem.
65.0
( 9)
56.3
(13)
70.9
(21)
57.9
(13)

Rep.
59.9
(10)
58.9
(10)
55.8
( 8)
54.3
( 9)

Dem.
55
( 9)
53
(13)
62
(22)
59
(13)

57.
(10)
52
( 8)
58
( 9)

SENIORITY
Dem.
Rep.
28.5
15.1
( 9)
(11)
19.2
33.7
(13)
(10)
21.3
27.8
(22)
( 8)
25.0
23.8
(13)
( 9)

57.3
(56)

57.4
(37)

58.2
(57)

57.6
(38)

26.1
(57)

GM=57.3b

Rep.
62
(11)

GM=58.0

20.9
(38)

GM=24 .0

aAverage age in 1969
bWeighted totals and grand mean

Differences in the personal attributes of senators as illustrated in Table IV
(and in graphic form which will be provided to the interested reader ) may help
to explain their voting behavior . As might be expected, Southern Democrats
were elected by the largest percentages , while Far Western Republicans had
the closest election victories. The Republican Party as the minority party
generally won by a smaller margin than the Democratic Party . Republicans
with closer election margins tended to vote more conservatively on desegregation of schools than did those with higher margins of victory. Although the
findings on this variable are somewhat less clear for Democrats , both Demo crat and Republican senators from the region with the closest average election
margins had the most liberal voting records .
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Democrats in the 91st Congr ess wer e only slightly old er than Republicans ,
while Southern senators were the oldest of the Democrats and the youngest of
the Republicans . It is likely that all thre e of the legislator attribute variables
discussed here are related. For example, the oldest group of senators in each
party were also those that had the greatest election margins as well as the most
seniority. Older Democrats tend ed to vote more conservatively on school
desegregation , while older Republicans had the most liberal voting record
among Senators from their party. This finding is, of course, related to region
since Southerners were both the oldest Democrats and the youngest Republicans .
In terms of intra-party seniority, the contrast is again on Southern
senators. They had by far the most seniority among Democrats , but the least
among Republicans. Senior Democrats voted increasingly conservative on
school desegregation , but senior Republicans had more liberal voting reco rds .
As a result of this fmding and that in the above paragraph , we can conclude
that the hypothesis that younger and junior senators are more likely to support
integration is confirmed for Democrats but disconfirmed for Republicans. As a
result of the interrelationship of these variables with each other and with
region , it was felt that it would be useful to perform partial correlations to
control for the ind ependent effect of these variables on voting behavior .
One must recognize that the correlations presented herein are of dubious
value , since there are only eight points to the data . Since the constituent
demographic variables were not available by party , the variables had to be
collapsed into the four regional groupings allowing only four data points. As a
result, the subsequent correlational analysis for the constituent variables is
even more questionable , particularly since it exhausts the available degrees of
freedom.
With these caveats in mind , the findings indicated a positive correlation of
.494 between constituency attitude and senators' roll-call votes . There appears to be only a slight relationship between the senators' voting behavior
and the personal characteristics isolated in this study (% election margin r =
.197, age r = .234). The third variable, seniority, was negatively correlated
with vote (r = - .277), but this is possibly a function of the fact that seniority
scores represent intra-party seniority and do not mean the same thing for
Democrats and Republicans.
In terms of constituency characteristics (again recognizing that only four
data points exist), there was a very strong positive relationship (r = .907)
between attitude and percent black , while there was also a strong negative
relationship (r = - . 929) between attitude and percent urban in the four
geographic regions. The correlation for constituent attitudes and senators'
roll-call behavior increased from r = .494 with eight data points tor= .690

23

CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE ON SENATE VOTING

with four, confirming that the earlier expressed caution in interpreting of the
results of these correlations was well-justified. Part of this divergence can be
explained by the fact that the latter calculation was computed with weighted
observations while the former was not. The problems discussed above of
interpreting bivariate relationships also apply to the partial correlations in this
study. When the effects of percent election margin and age are eliminated, the
correlation between constituent attitudes and senators' voting behavior is
reduced to r = .154 and r = .183 resp ec tively .
IV. DISCUSSION
The results of this study do indicate some correspondence between constituency attitudes and senators' roll-call behavior on the issue of public school
desegregation. The linear transformation of constituent scores in Table V
illustrates that constituent attitudes are far less dispersed than senators' voting
behavior on this issue. With an expanded data base , a two-way analysis of
variance would be a useful technique to determine whether the differences in
means are statistically significant. Although it is difficult to make even tentative judgments about representation in the absence of such measures, some
preliminary statements are offered here .
TABLE V. Comparison of Constituent and Senators ' Scores
REGION AND PARTY
CONSTITUENTS a (X )
(x)
(x-x)
4.57
.07
Northeast
4.35
.29
Dem .
4.85
-. 21
Rep.
4.71
-.07
Midwest
Dem.
4.64
0
4.85
-.21
Rep.
4.89
-.43
South
-. 13
Dem.
4.77
5.24
-.60
Rep.
4.52
.12
Far West
4.43
.21
Dem.
-. 07
Rep.
4.71
Grand mean=

4.64

SENATORS
(y)
1. 98
1. 74
2.17
2.55
1.38
3.94
5.39
5.73
4.46
3.66
2.88
4.79
3.57

(Y)
(y-ij)
1.59
1.83
1.40
1.02
2.19
- .37
-1.82
-2.16
- .89
- .09
.69
-1.22

asimp le linear transformation from Table I

The present fmdings are convincing that regional-party grouping is a
useful level of analysis. It appears that the region whose attitudes are the least
reflected by legislators is the Far West. While it is the most liberal region in
terms of average constituent response on the index , it has conservative
legislators who are more liberal only than Southern Democrats. Also, it seems
that Democratic senators from the Far West more closely approximate the
region's wishes than do their Republican counterparts.
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The goal of determining the level of representativeness that exists is
suggested in this data but is perhaps too ambitious to be ascertained with
certainty from these preliminary findings . It appears likely that this relationship can be measured more clearly only by disaggregating the data to the state
level, for both senators and constituents. While this would have the disadvantage of eliminating the representativeness of the constituent sample , it would
allow greater perception in the constituency-representative linkage than the
present study affords . It would have the additional advantage of being more
likely to represent constituent views than studies using the congressional
district as the unit of analysis because of the very small number of cases
present in those studies.

